the discussing ma'or policy issues. the abili to discussing major policy issues. the ability to bring perspective to policy matters cover is potentially a very wide area indeed. is there any governance or code or manual that defines the role of a political advisor or is it very much a matterfor the individual political advisor or is it very much a matter for the individual adviser and his or her minister?— a matter for the individual adviser and his or her minister? there is a secial and his or her minister? there is a special advisers _ and his or her minister? there is a special advisers code _ and his or her minister? there is a special advisers code and - and his or her minister? there is a special advisers code and it - special advisers code and it resembles but isn't identical to the civil service code. special advisers are specially appointed as temporary civil servants. that is how their employment contracts work. but rather as we were discussing earlier, there is an organic element to it and their role will depend on the department, on their personal relationship with the minister. a number 10, their personal relationship and authority with the

prime minister. there are rules and boundaries set to those roles by the code and their employment. but they are very much — code and their employment. but they are very much not _ code and their employment. but they are very much not civil— code and their employment. but they are very much not civil servants, - are very much not civil servants, therefore they are answerable only to the minister who appoints them, governed by or constrained by their special advisers code to which they are subject?— special advisers code to which they are subject? are sub'ect? correct. formally, the prime are subject? correct. formally, the prime minister _ are subject? correct. formally, the prime minister appoints _ are subject? correct. formally, the prime minister appoints all - are subject? correct. formally, the prime minister appoints all special| prime minister appoints all special advisers, even those who are attached to ministers and often move with them. so their personal affiliation is most likely to their own secretary of state or minister but informal employment terms, it is the prime minister who signs off the appointment. i the prime minister who signs off the appointment-— appointment. i want to ask you lease appointment. i want to ask you please about — appointment. i want to ask you please about the _ appointment. i want to ask you please about the efficiency, - please about the efficiency, efficacy of mrjohnson�*s administration on the cusp of the pandemic following the general

election in december, the previous year. as an as ministration, that is to say, a body of government coming into office and able to pick up the threads of government or the handles of government, was it a particularly experience administration, 7 there experience administration,? there were some — experience administration,? there were some very — experience administration,? there were some very senior _ experience administration,? there were some very senior ministers. l were some very senior ministers. michael gove, duchy of lancaster, had served almost uninterrupted since 2010. there was a brief period when he wasn't a cabinet minister. mr hancock, the health secretary, had been in cabinet for several years. there were others as well. overall, and i think helen mcnamara touched on this, in a sense it was

more like an opposition party coming into power after a general election that had been in power of ten years because of the nature of the brexit process and the change in personality is that mrjohnson brought in when he became prime minister. in brought in when he became prime minister. , ., , , brought in when he became prime minister. , ., , ., , , ., minister. in terms of its ability to be able to focus _ minister. in terms of its ability to be able to focus and _ minister. in terms of its ability to be able to focus and deal- minister. in terms of its ability to be able to focus and deal with . minister. in terms of its ability to be able to focus and deal with an| be able to focus and deal with an emerging crisis and one that would envelop the entire country, how focused with the administration in the early days on its own agendas or other matters which it wished to pursue? other matters which it wished to ursue? . other matters which it wished to . ursue? ., ., , other matters which it wished to ursue? ., , ., , other matters which it wished to ursue? ., , ._ , pursue? that was the primary focus. the general — pursue? that was the primary focus. the general election, _ pursue? that was the primary focus. the general election, as _ pursue? that was the primary focus. the general election, as you - pursue? that was the primary focus. the general election, as you said, i the general election, as you said, took place in 2019. the legal deadline for the deadline was the sist deadline for the deadline was the 31st of january so that was the primary focus in january, 2020.

because they had a majority, they needed to change some of the legislation that some of which they would have to compromise on when it was a minority government before the general election in order to see through brexit. so that was very much the focus of january. then once that was done, the prime minister's focus was then on the manifesto and essentially setting the five year term as he expected off on its course with a cabinet reshuffle that didn't take place until february because of the brexit inflection point. because of the brexit inflection oint. ~ . , because of the brexit inflection oint. . .,, ., because of the brexit inflection oint. . ., , ' ~' point. was that reshuffle, i think iran the 14th. .. _ point. was that reshuffle, i think iran the 14th. .. correct. - point. was that reshuffle, i think iran the 14th. .. correct. there i point. was that reshuffle, i think i iran the 14th. .. correct. there was iran the 14th... correct. there was reference to your introduction of a programme called the fusion programme, by which you sought to change some of the mechanics underpinning the cabinet office. in

relation to its secretariat in particular. when was that programme introduced by you and what impact do you assess that it had? irate introduced by you and what impact do you assess that it had?— you assess that it had? we had introduced _ you assess that it had? we had introduced it _ you assess that it had? we had introduced it into _ you assess that it had? we had introduced it into the _ you assess that it had? we had introduced it into the national. introduced it into the national security community from 2018 onwards and that is where we developed it. just very briefly, the underlying philosophy was to deal with the fact whitehall is f essentially, has very strong vertical structures between departments, that can become side load and my strong view was and remains that the cabinet secretariat, whether a single secretariat, whether a single secretariat or the individual components, should provide as much as possible of the horizontal connective tissue. so that was the thought behind that programme. we developed it in the national security committee and then i was seeking to extend... became cabinet secretary into a unified cabinet

secretary at... tea directors general, deliberately designed to look like the olympic rings, to show there were overlaps because i felt it was necessary to have that connective tissue in the centre to balance the very strong vertical structures of departments of state. were those changes to the machinery of the cabinet office office introduced in january and of the cabinet office office introduced injanuary and february? we began some of them beforehand, it was an ongoing programme but certainly to the broader cabinet secretariat, it was in its very earliest stages.— secretariat, it was in its very earliest stages. secretariat, it was in its very earliest sta . es. . ., earliest stages. the evidence from alex thomas. _ earliest stages. the evidence from alex thomas, who _ earliest stages. the evidence from alex thomas, who was _ earliest stages. the evidence from alex thomas, who was the - earliest stages. the evidence from alex thomas, who was the expert| earliest stages. the evidence from | alex thomas, who was the expert i suppose expert on governance or political science instructed by the inquiry, was to the effect that that

programme created some complexity and structural confusion, certainly in its early days, by necessary virtue of the changes that you had sought to bring about. would you agree that there was a degree of complexity and confusion brought about as a result of that programme? certainly complexity and in a sense, that was deliberate. government is a complex set of organisations and i wanted the cabinet secretariat to be the place that managed that complexity. clearly, iwas the place that managed that complexity. clearly, i was seeking to avoid confusion. i recognised that i was asking civil servants to operate in a different way to the way that they might have traditionally done so, operating across boundaries rather than within defined responsibilities and that change of institutional culture and behaviour takes time. ml change of institutional culture and behaviour takes time.— change of institutional culture and behaviour takes time. all right. now turnin: to behaviour takes time. all right. now turning to your— behaviour takes time. all right. now

turning to your first _ behaviour takes time. all right. now turning to your first understanding i turning to your first understanding of the emergence of the virus in china, your statement makes plain that this issue was raised with you by sir patrick vallance on the 21st of january, i by sir patrick vallance on the 21st ofjanuary, i think it was the same day the world health organization published its first novel coronavirus report. did you coronavirus report. correct. did you receive around _ coronavirus report. correct. did you receive around that _ coronavirus report. correct. did you receive around that time _ coronavirus report. correct. did you receive around that time a - coronavirus report. correct. did you receive around that time a formal i receive around that time a formal request from the dhs a perhaps in the form of its secretary of state mr hancock, for a cobra meeting to be convened?— be convened? yes, i don't recall if it was a formal— be convened? yes, i don't recall if it was a formal request _ be convened? yes, i don't recall if it was a formal request but - it was a formal request but certainly i was asked if a cobra could and should take place. did you exceed to that _ could and should take place. did you exceed to that request _ could and should take place. did you | exceed to that request straightaway? not straightaway, i wanted to ensure a cobra if it took place was properly prepared. i was concerned that it might be communicated in

a... ina that it might be communicated in a... in a form that could be unnerving for public communications. at the time, the government's approach was to try and maintain calm in its public communications and the fact of a cobra might have disrupted that. but actually, i think two days later, i was advised by the head of the civil contingencies secretariat that there was enough of a cross government requirement that it did make sense to go ahead and i agreed to the request. did to go ahead and i agreed to the reuuest. , i. ., to go ahead and i agreed to the reuuest. , ., ., , ., request. did you not doubt to some extent that — request. did you not doubt to some extent that the _ request. did you not doubt to some extent that the aim _ request. did you not doubt to some extent that the aim of _ request. did you not doubt to some extent that the aim of the - request. did you not doubt to some extent that the aim of the request i extent that the aim of the request from the dhse for a cobra to be convened?— from the dhse for a cobra to be convened? ., , ., , . convened? there had been a practice or a habit, probably, _ convened? there had been a practice or a habit, probably, which _ convened? there had been a practice or a habit, probably, which had - or a habit, probably, which had stretched back several years, of cobras being convened for

communications purposes rather than primarily to make decisions that couldn't be made elsewhere. i was confident that this was a health issue. i was confident that with a very experienced team, they had all the authority they needed in order to be able to make the substantive decisions and i felt that a cobra that might have been convened primarily for communications purposes wasn't wise. as i said, two days later i was advised there was a genuine cross government basis for it and i agreed. mar; genuine cross government basis for it and i agreed-— it and i agreed. may we be plain leased it and i agreed. may we be plain pleased as _ it and i agreed. may we be plain pleased as to — it and i agreed. may we be plain pleased as to what _ it and i agreed. may we be plain pleased as to what you - it and i agreed. may we be plain pleased as to what you mean i it and i agreed. may we be plain pleased as to what you mean by communication purposes, where you concerned that a cobra i was being called by the dhse for presentational purposes, that is to say to make a splash about the role of the dhse and that is why you initially hesitated? that of the dhse and that is why you initially hesitated?— initially hesitated? that is a fair summary of _ initially hesitated? that is a fair summary of my _ initially hesitated? that is a fair summary of my thinking, - initially hesitated? that is a fair summary of my thinking, mr. initially hesitated? that is a fair . summary of my thinking, mr keith. all the right to. you make plain in

whatsapp messages between yourself and mr hancock on the 23rd of january that you had agreed a ministerial cobra, you use these words, "i have agreed a ministerial cobra tomorrow". was that decision one for the cabinet secretary or where you speaking on behalf of the government as a whole in relation to this decision?— this decision? formally, one would reauire this decision? formally, one would require the — this decision? formally, one would require the consent _ this decision? formally, one would require the consent of _ this decision? formally, one would require the consent of the - this decision? formally, one would require the consent of the prime i require the consent of the prime minister but there is always a shorthand in these matters and i think the prime minister would have expected me to provide the advice. mr hancock would have expected it to be me. so in effect, the decision was mine, even though formally i guess i was speaking on behalf of the prime minister's authority. the first cobra to _ the prime minister's authority. the first cobra to place on january the first cobra to place onjanuary the 24th and was chaired by mr hancock. there was then a second cobra on the 29th of january. there was then a second cobra on the 29th ofjanuary. could there was then a second cobra on the 29th of january. could we have that on the screen, 56226. we can see a

number of ministers on that first page in attendance. if we go over to the second page we can see a number of parliamentary undersecretary of state, a of minister... ministers or members of devolved administration parliaments dialled in and a number of officials like chris whitty, catherine hammond, many names now familiar to the inquiry. if we go over one further page to page three, we can see the remainder of the officials who dialled in. there was it would seem no cabinet minister present at that cobra or cabinet office official, other than i think the director of government communications, alex aiken, who may not have been in the cabinet office

or number 10. but is the secretariat to cobra provided by the cabinet office? , ~ ~' ,, office? yes. mr keith, i think you said no cabinet _ office? yes. mr keith, i think you said no cabinet minister - office? yes. mr keith, i think you said no cabinet minister was. - office? yes. mr keith, i think you said no cabinet minister was. if i office? yes. mr keith, i think you i said no cabinet minister was. if you look at the first page... did” said no cabinet minister was. if you look at the first page. . ._ look at the first page... did i not say cabinet _ look at the first page... did i not say cabinet office? _ look at the first page... did i not say cabinet office? you - look at the first page... did i not say cabinet office? you are - look at the first page... did i not | say cabinet office? you are quite right, i said say cabinet office? you are quite right, isaid no say cabinet office? you are quite right, i said no cabinet minister, i meant to say no cabinet office minister or official attended. indeed, so i think that is correct. the secretariat for cobra is the civil contingencies secretariat, thatis civil contingencies secretariat, that is part of the cabinet secretariat and i know we will be discussing that the other. they provide the secretariat for cobra when the normal way. as you see, it is minuted just as any other ministerial meeting is. so in practice. _ ministerial meeting is. so in practice, whatever - ministerial meeting is. so in practice, whatever actions i ministerial meeting is. so in i practice, whatever actions are ministerial meeting is. so in practice, whatever actions are taken from a cobra meeting, whatever thinking or learning has to be disseminated throughout government comes to the cabinet office by the

virtue that it provides the secretariat?— virtue that it provides the secretariat? ., . . ~ ., secretariat? correct. right back all riuht. if secretariat? correct. right back all right- if we — secretariat? correct. right back all right- if we can _ secretariat? correct. right back all right. if we can look _ secretariat? correct. right back all right. if we can look please - secretariat? correct. right back all right. if we can look please at - secretariat? correct. right back allj right. if we can look please at page five, paragraph three. we can see and we have looked at this paragraph and we have looked at this paragraph a fairfew times and we have looked at this paragraph a fair few times now. the chief medical officer said the uk planning assumptions were based on a reasonable worst—case scenario. there were two scenarios to be considered. the first was the spread was confined within china, the second was that the spread was not limited to china and there would be a pandemic —like scenario with the uk impacted. a pandemic -like scenario with the uk impacted-— a pandemic -like scenario with the uk imacted. ., , ,, , uk impacted. lord dhse, the inquiry has asked a — uk impacted. lord dhse, the inquiry has asked a number— uk impacted. lord dhse, the inquiry has asked a number of— uk impacted. lord dhse, the inquiry has asked a number of witnesses - has asked a number of witnesses about what they took from this information and in particular, the fact that under the second scenario, there appears to be an assumption or a recognition that if the spread is not limited to china, if the virus

leaks from china, then there would be, not there might be a pandemic like scenario with the uk effective. so control of the virus is essential and if it leads china there would be very serious problems indeed. i want therefore to ask you when the cabinet office saw this paragraph, when it understood what the chief medical officer was saying, to what extent did it appreciate, at this early stage, the 29th of january, that once the virus left china, if it left china, there would be an inevitable crisis as far as the united kingdom is concerned. i united kingdom is concerned. i think... we wouldn't have understood that to be inevitable. in the scale of the crisis that we faced a couple of the crisis that we faced a couple of months later, and that's partly

because i think this is in other documents, that this was a discussion of the reasonable worst—case scenario and in late january, early february, i think the chief medical officer gave that around one in ten probability. by the end of february, i think it was about one in five. and so essentially, i don't want to jump ahead too much, mr keith, because i know you want to go through some of this, but essentially, within february, the course of february, there were two processes. one was in there were two processes. one was in the foreground and one in the background, at least from my perspective. in the foreground, where the briefings to cabinet etc and i believe you may want to come back to some of those, which was essentially talking about this situation as it was, the probability

that the uk would have a severe impact. and in the background, at that stage, run through the cobra process with the health secretary and his team in the chair, was the planning should the reasonable worst—case scenario manifest itself. those two were related but they were distinct. is those two were related but they were distinct. , , , ., distinct. is this the nub of it, there is a — distinct. is this the nub of it, there is a reference - distinct. is this the nub of it, there is a reference thereto l there is a reference thereto planning assumptions being based on the reasonable worst—case scenario, but when the chief medical officer went on to say essentially in practice, in reality, there are two scenarios to be considered, it wasn't sufficiently understood that he wasn't there talking about the reasonable worst—case scenario, he was talking about the reality of what would happen? either the spread is confined or it is not. but the government thinking focused perhaps over much of the doctrine of

reasonable worst—case scenario and the probability of that occurring rather than on what the chief medical officer was saying would happen? is that a fair summary? i think that is a fair summary. by early february, it became apparent that covid was unlikely to be contained within wuhan or hubei province. as the cabinet secretary, what did you understand to be the position in relation to the availability of practical measures which could stop the spread of the virus into the united kingdom, if it were to emerge significantly from china? i refer to this later on and so i'm trying not to impose a false memory. of trying not to impose a false memory. of what i believed at the time. early february. i wouldn't suggest i had a deep

understanding of what the practical measures might have been. and essentially, as i said, what i was really seeing, partly because i was dealing with many other issues, was what the briefings into cabinet etc from the chief medical officer, health secretary and so on and i presumed that in parallel, in the background if you like, the planning, operational planning to put in place the mechanisms we would need to tackle a reasonable worst—case should it no longer be a scenario but a fact, were happening in parallel. and certainly that was my presumption at the time. i was aware from what the chief medical officer was saying of what some of those measures might be but only in the most high—level terms. did

those measures might be but only in the most high-level terms.— the most high-level terms. did you understand — the most high-level terms. did you understand at _ the most high-level terms. did you understand at that _ the most high-level terms. did you understand at that high _ the most high-level terms. did you understand at that high level- the most high-level terms. did you understand at that high level that i understand at that high level that the control measures such as they were would be effective in preventing the spread of the virus throughout the community and the united kingdom, or that there would be very real practical difficulties with their efficacy, whether they would work? fist with their efficacy, whether they would work?— would work? at the time, my understanding _ would work? at the time, my understanding from - would work? at the time, my understanding from the - would work? at the time, my i understanding from the briefings would work? at the time, my - understanding from the briefings we had was that it might be possible to manage the spread of the virus but that it was inevitable, because nobody had immunity, that it would spread through the population. fight! spread through the population. and that is the genesis of the mitigation herd immunity debate? exactly. mitigation herd immunity debate? exactl . . , mitigation herd immunity debate? exactl. . , , mitigation herd immunity debate? exactl. ., , ,~ ., ., exactly. that is very clear. coming back to cabinet, _ exactly. that is very clear. coming back to cabinet, you _ exactly. that is very clear. coming back to cabinet, you have - exactly. that is very clear. coming back to cabinet, you have made i exactly. that is very clear. coming | back to cabinet, you have made the point is that of course as cabinet secretary, you are necessarily guided to a very great degree by the

information provided by cabinet to which you are the secretary, rather than perhaps the micro level detail of cobra. in hindsight, sol than perhaps the micro level detail of cobra. in hindsight, so i make plain in hindsight, do you think that cabinet was given in those meetings in february a proper understanding of the seriousness of the crisis and in particular the realisation or the information that such levels of control as might be deployed to control the spread of the virus were unlikely to work? i the virus were unlikely to work? i think on the latter point, i would agree with the proposition you make. that if you look at the cabinet minutes of that period, the first half of february, there was at a high level a good explanation of the nature of the virus to the extent

the scientists understood it. of course, it was still very new. there was an explanation about the potential level of fatalities and casualties, should the reasonable worst—case manifest itself, and that was based i think still at that stage on a flu pandemic carradine. but there was an assurance that plans were in place to manage it and in hindsight, it would have, as you suggest, those plans should have been interrogated more carefully by me and at the cabinet level. there are indeed — me and at the cabinet level. there are indeed repeated _ me and at the cabinet level. there are indeed repeated references i me and at the cabinet level. there are indeed repeated references to plans to manage and the civil secretariat announced plans were under way to manage, taking steps to manage the activity. activities are being carried out to plan for this eventuality. what did you understand

those plans to consist of, albeit at high level? what did you think in a practice was being drawn up, was being done to meet the threat of a virus, which was, as was generally understood, uncontrollable once it left china? ., , left china? some of the plans i recall that _ left china? some of the plans i recall that l — left china? some of the plans i recall that i would _ left china? some of the plans i recall that i would have - left china? some of the plans i recall that i would have been i left china? some of the plans i - recall that i would have been aware of all was aware of, so i knew that one of the issues that had arisen from exercise sickness, the flu pandemic exercise in 2016, was how to manage excess mortality. so i was aware there were plans of that kind, operational plans of that kind. i presumed but i don't think explicitly about presumed that for example plans to protect, quarantine the most vulnerable, the most medically vulnerable, would have been part of that planning but i

didn't interrogate that at that time. . , . time. there was indeed in the end a ve aood time. there was indeed in the end a very good shielding _ time. there was indeed in the end a very good shielding plan _ time. there was indeed in the end a very good shielding plan drawn - time. there was indeed in the end a very good shielding plan drawn up, | very good shielding plan drawn up, drawn up as we have heard at pace and notwithstanding considerable complexity in the middle to late march. and there was obviously a plan for hand washing and there were plans for the dealing with the numbers of deaths which might be expected under the reasonable worst—case scenario. so presumably body bags, how to deal with... with bodies. and there were also plans to deal with the legislative underpinning of whatever public order powers the government might wish to take to manage the crisis. but none of those plans in any way deal with the control, stopping the virus from entering the united kingdom and then spreading

throughout the community. was that understood or appreciated at all? no. the kind of capability that would have been required to do that, and i think you mentioned this in your own opening statement to this module, mr keith, is the kind of capability east asian nations had to be able to forward and backward contact trace people coming through the border and imposing strict border controls in order to keep incidents at very low levels so that thatis incidents at very low levels so that that is a practical proposition. that capability did not exist at that time. i wouldn't claim to have had enough knowledge myself to know that that was a capability that was important or indeed that it was missing. but clearly that became apparent and it is that kind of thing that i am referring to when i minute the prime minister later in the spring about the position we

found ourselves in at the onset of the pandemic. 50 found ourselves in at the onset of the pandemic-— found ourselves in at the onset of the andemic. , ., , , , the pandemic. so in summary, is this fair, the the pandemic. so in summary, is this fair. the capability — the pandemic. so in summary, is this fair, the capability did _ the pandemic. so in summary, is this fair, the capability did not _ fair, the capability did not exist... and that of course is nothing, nothing can be done about that, at least in the very short time span between february and the full emergence of the virus. but that capability or absence of capability were simply not the subject of extensive debate? there wasn't debate at the highest levels of government to the effect of, the virus is coming, we must have a means of stopping its spread, of controlling it significantly, but we don't have any means, what are we to do, that debate was absent? i don't have any means, what are we to do, that debate was absent?— do, that debate was absent? i think the first part _ do, that debate was absent? i think the first part of _ do, that debate was absent? i think the first part of that _ do, that debate was absent? i think the first part of that debate - the first part of that debate certainly was absent and i wouldn't have encouraged it in the sense, as you imply in your question, it would

have been bolting the stable door. that capability couldn't have been constructed in the time available. there was extensive discussion about what the right strategy was so dealing with the spread of the virus. notoriously, thus quashing the sombrero, which i know you will probably want to pursue in more detail. there was a lot of discussion of that.- detail. there was a lot of discussion of that. ~ ., , ., ., discussion of that. was there too much focus _ discussion of that. was there too much focus on _ discussion of that. was there too much focus on strategy, - discussion of that. was there too much focus on strategy, on - much focus on strategy, on strategising, rather than dealing more prosaically with the practical implications of the emerging virus? we should have been able to do both. on the 29th of january, the chief medical officer, professor chris whitty, e—mailed professor edmonds of the london school of hygiene and tropical medicine and professor ferguson of imperial college london with a request to model what could be done to delay the upswing of an

epidemic. professor edmonds says in the course of a fairly lengthy e—mail given the apparent speed of spread, it seems unlikely that contact tracing and isolation will be effective in buying as much time. there was a basic system for contact tracing, the first few hundred cases system, a system by which travel and index cases could be tracked and the virus suppressed in those particular cases. did hugh as cabinet secretary no, were you told early —— late january, early feathery, that it was unlikely the system would buy any more than a short delay? i unlikely the system would buy any more than a short delay?— more than a short delay? i don't recall it in _ more than a short delay? i don't recall it in exactly _ more than a short delay? i don't recall it in exactly those - more than a short delay? i don't recall it in exactly those terms, | recall it in exactly those terms, although if that were contained for example in one of their daily

situation reports, the crips as they became known, then i might have glanced at it. what i did understand, i think it was at that time, was the advice that closing the borders, obviously there is more to it than that phrase, would only have a short, the effect would be only a fairly short delay in terms of the spread of the virus. i seem to recall five days was the number mentioned. but i wouldn't suggest, mr keith, i was aware of those additional layers to that question. the reality was at the highest levels of government that the fact that the absence of a capability, the absence of a practical means of control was known but perhaps the ramifications, the consequences of that knowledge were not fully thought through. fir that knowledge were not fully thought through.— thought through. or not fully understood, _ thought through. or not fully understood, i— thought through. or not fully understood, ithink. - thought through. or not fully understood, i think. there i thought through. or not fully i understood, i think. there was thought through. or not fully - understood, i think. there was a stock-take _ understood, i think. there was a stock-take meeting _ understood, i think. there was a stock-take meeting between -

understood, i think. there was aj stock-take meeting between the understood, i think. there was a - stock-take meeting between the prime stock—take meeting between the prime minister and the secretary of state for health and social care on the 4th for health and social care on the lith of february which you attended. can we have one for six 558? the letter from the private secretary to the prime minister to the dhs e deals with or sets out the issues which were debated at that meeting. the letter appears to indicate that coronavirus was only addressed by way of a short update at which during which the prime minister stressed the need to continue to explain our stance to maintain public confidence in the plan, on further travel restrictions the secretary of state was engaging i colleagues and there was a request to keep number ten closely involved. by to keep number ten closely involved. by virtue of the matters under consideration, the maintenance of

public confidence, what can be done